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PLAINTIFFS' ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion iii dismissing the trial court 
case by failing to consider the factors required to justify dismissal.. 
2. Whether the discovery responses provided by the Plaintiff in substance 
complied with the requirement of initial disclosures or was harmless error. 
3. Wether equity demands a remand to the trial 0ourt. 
4. Whether the Defendants were acting in bad faith. 
For issue #1 the standard of review is a two part test of abuse of discretion 
coupled with an absent of injustice. Plaintiffs accede to the case cited by Defendants: 
PDC Consulting. Inc. v. Porter. 2008 UT App 372, 196 P.3d 626 %5 (Utah App. 2008): 
"[We] do not disturb [a trial court's order of dismissal for failure to prosecute] absent an 
abuse of discretion and a likelihood that an injustice occurred.'1 (Cites Omitted.) 
For Issues Presented for Review number 2 the standard of review is substantial 
compliance. Tech-Fluid Servs., Inc. v. Gavilan Operating. Inc., 787 P.2d 1328, 1333 
(Utah Ct.App. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant for breach of contract, breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and infliction of emotional distress. The Plaintiffs 
responded to discovery requests sent by the Defendants, which requests contained 
substantially all of the information that is included in the Utah R. Civ. P. 26 initial 
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disclosures. Defendant objected that the Plaintiffs never filed any document entitled 
"Initial Disclosures" but never denied that they received the answers to discovery 
containing all of the information that would have otherwise been contained in the Rule 26 
initial disclosures. The court, based on the failure to file the 'initial disclosures' form, 
dismissed the Plaintiffs' suit. 
As a result of the dismissal the Plaintiffs suffer a great injustice including the loss 
of substantial funds and with no other remedy. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Please see the Statement of Facts filed in the Plaintiffs' Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Plaintiffs' arguments set forth in their brief have not been addressed by the 
Defendant's Brief. Having not responded, any defense is waived. Therefore based on 
Defendant's failure to respond, the Plaintiffs should be deemed to have prevailed on those 
issues, which is sufficient justification to remand the case to the lower court. 
The proper test for dismissal is a two part test. First is abuse of discretion and the 
second is an absent of injustice. Both parties rely on the same case, but analyze it 
differently. While there is disagreement about the analysis, one crucial element is 
undeniable, the dismissal resulted in injustice for the Plaintiffs. The Rules incorporate 
substantial justice as a lynchpin - and the Plaintiffs fail to make their case that dismissal 
of the lawsuit resulted in substantial justice under Utah law. 
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The Defendant takes a strict compliance standard with Rule 26. However, that 
stance is not justified under Utah's "substantial compliance" doctrine. In short the rule is 
that if the action is procedural, then substantial compliance is acceptance, absent the 
creation of prejudice. The Defendant does not identify any prejudice, therefore 
substantial compliance is acceptable. 
Defendant's last issue is whether the Plaintiff can raise for the first time on appeal 
the issues of Defendant's failure to respond to discovery requests. The Plaintiffs do not 
seek sanctions for the Defendant's failure to cooperate, only that the Defendant appeared 
with unclean hands. "One who seeks equity, must do equity." The Defendant has not 
complied with this maxim. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Whether the Trial Court Properly Exercised its Discretion by Dismissing 
the Action below for Failure to Prosecute Where Plaintiffs Engaged in a 
Pattern of Delay by Refusing to Provide Initial Disclosures Despite Court 
Order to Do So? 
The standard of review for dismissal is a two part test (A) abuse of discretion 
coupled with (B) an absent of injustice.. PDC Consulting, Inc. v. Porter. 2008 UT App 
372, 196 P.3d 626 p (Utah App. 2008): "[We] do not disturb [a trial court's order of 
dismissal for failure to prosecute] absent an abuse of discretion and a likelihood that an 
injustice occurred." Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State. 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994). 
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Defendant also cites Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor. 
Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975) and the five factors suggested therein. A comparison 
of the two positions on the Westinghouse factors is helpful. 
1. The Conduct of Both Parties. The Defendants stated that they did not receive 
the initial disclosures in a timely manner. However, the Plaintiffs' served their discovery 
requests on the Defendants on March 16, 2009 prior to any objection by the Defendant. 
Those responses contained substantially all of the information - and more - that would 
have been filed in the Rule 26 Initial Disclosures. Defendants do not deny receiving this 
information. 
2. The Opportunity Each Party Has Had to Move the Case Forward. 
Neither party was aggressive about moving the case forward. The Defendants failed to 
answer the Plaintiffs' discovery requests, neither did they follow up on the answers to 
discovery provided by the Plaintiffs. Admittedly Plaintiffs were not moving the case 
aggressively either. Both parties could have done more to move the case forward. 
Defendants do not deny this in their Brief. 
3. What Each Party Has Done to Move the Case Forward. 
The Plaintiffs responded to the Defendants' discovery requests. The Defendants did not 
respond to the Plaintiffs' discovery requests. The Defendants did seek sanctions for the 
failure to file the initial discovery. Notably the Defendants possessed all of the 
information that they needed to go forward, however the Defendant was focused on a 
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single form as if there was some magic in that form that pnevented them from defending 
themselves. 
4. The Amount of Difficulty or Prejudice That Mtay Have Been Caused to the 
Other Side. 
The Defendants never identified any single difficulty or prejudice related to the 
failure to receive the initial disclosures. They already had ill of the initial disclosure 
information in the Plaintiffs' Answers to the Defendants5 discovery since March 16, 
2009. The Defendant does not deny this either, although they claim "inconvenience" and 
costs related to the Defendant not having the form. Defendant does not cite any prejudice 
they suffered.. 
5. Most Important, Whether Injustice May Result from the Dismissal. 
This factor is determinative. The dismissal of the Plaintiffs * case left the Plaintiffs 
without a remedy for their claim that the Defendant breached the contract, violated the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongfully removed property, and inflicted 
emotional distress on the Plaintiffs. Upon dismissal, the Plaintiffs were left without a 
remedy or offset, while the Defendants got paid in full, plus were able to wrongfully 
remove property from the Plaintiffs' home.. That result is ntianifest injustice. 
The Defendant relies on Rohan v. Boseman, 46 P.3d 1753 (Utah App. 2002). There 
a year and a half after filing suit the court issued an order to show cause why the case 
should not be dismissed. Later, over two years after the comjplaint was filed the court 
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ordered a date by which discovery was to be completed. After several more months and 
another attorney, Rohan entered his own appearance and sought a voluntary dismissal, 
which was denied. Rohan then appeared pro se at trial but claimed he could not go 
forward with trial. That court dismissed his case after finding that the Defendants there 
were prejudiced. 
Rohan is not on point. There Rohan had over two years before trial. The instant 
case was filed and dismissed within one year. Rohan appeared at trial, the Plaintiff here 
has been denied trial. Rohan had a shot at trial, the Plaintiffs here have been unjustly 
denied a trial. The focus for the last 6 months of the instant case has been on whether a 
single form has been filed, not on the substantive information already provided, and the 
actual issues. 
Utah focuses on whether substantial justice is being obtained. Cf. Ut.R.Civ.P. 
Rule 8(f); Rule 61; Lucero v. Kennard. 125 P.3d 917, 292 (Utah 2005); Fennv.Leads 
Enterprises. Inc.. 103 P.3d 156, 161 (Utah App. 2004); Nipper v. Douglas. 90 P.3d 649, 
653 (Utah App. 2004). Dismissal of the Plaintiffs' complaint does not result in 
substantial justice. 
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2. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Finding That Plaintiffs Did Not 
Provide the Initial Disclosures Required by Utah R. Civ.p. 26 and 
Court Order? 
The Standard of Review is substantial compliance regarding compliance with a 
Rule. Tech-Fluid Servs., Inc. v. Gavilan Operating. Inc.. 787 P.2d 1328, 1333 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990) (Tech-Fluid concerned interpretation of Ut.R.Civ.P. Rule 69(f)(2).):1 
If failure to adhere to the requirements will affect a substantive right of one 
of the parties and possibly prejudice that party, then courts require strict 
compliance. On the other hand, if the requirements are merely procedural 
and will nt prejudice one of the parties, substantial compliance is sufficient. 
Without question Rule 26 is procedural. Therefore substantial compliance is 
sufficient. The trial court erred when it failed to consider substantial compliance. 
Defendant argues under Calkins v Pacel Corp., 2008 WL 2311565 (W.D.Va. June 
4 2008) that there is no substantial equivalent to initial disclosures, in other words Calkins 
requires strict compliance.. Calkins is not Utah law, and further we have no information 
of any differences between West Virgina laws and court rules exist. Tech-Flluid 
precludes the use of Calkins. 
Defendant claims that there was not substantial compliance. Utah law 
contemplates situations where Rule 26 has not been substantially complied with, and 
provides a possible remedy. In Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, 141 P.3d 629 
(Utah App. 2006) this court struck an affidavit of a witness wfio, although being 
1
 See also State v. LovelL 2010 UT 48, 20061025 (UTSC) (substantial compliance 
with Ut.R.Crim.P. Rule 11). 
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identified as a witness was not identified as an expert witness. Comparing to the instant 
case, the lower court would have been better advised to strike any portions of 
testamentary evidence that the Defendant can identify as prejudicial by reason of a failure 
to disclose under Rule 26. The lower court did not do that because the court never made 
the comparison between the information in the discovery responses and that which would 
have been provided under Foile 26. To dismiss an entire action however, simply goes to 
far. 
Defendant for the first time engages in a comparison between the discovery 
responses and Rule 26. The Defendant never raised these objections or arguments below 
and should be precluded from raising them now. 
Defendant objects because the expected testimony of the witnesses was not set 
forth. Interrogatory 14 identified all improperly performed work. Interrogatory 15, 
identified all documents. Interrogatory 24 identified photographs. Interrogatory 25 
identified expert witnesses. 
Rule 26(a)(1) requires the names and information for the witnesses. Interrogatory 1 
identifies the Plaintiff. Interrogatory 6 recited all conversations or agreements alleged to 
have occurred. Interrogatory 8 discussed all injuries, economic or otherwise suffered by 
the Plaintiffs. Interrogatory 9 requested detailed damages. Interrogatory 10 provided the 
identity of "all individuals who have stated that the quality of the installation" was 
substandard. Thus part 1 was substantially complied with. The only 'omission' was that 
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an expert witness had not yet been named, but that upon naming one, the Defendant 
would be advised. 
There were responses for production of documents that stated that the Defendants 
were searching for records. However, Rule 26 requires the Plaintiff to provide the 
documents that the Plaintiff possessed. In response to the request for production of 
documents the Plaintiffs provided copies of the documents they possessed, with the 
additional promise that if any more documents were located that they would also be 
provided. That promise is not a breach of Rule 26 or the rules of discovery. 
Most importantly, the Defendant does not identify a single item that constitutes 
prejudice to him. Note that even if this court upholds the substantial compliance doctrine, 
the Defendant may still conduct additional discovery to avoid any hypothetical prejudice. 
However, without the Defendant suffering a prejudice, there is no justice in dismissing 
the case. 
3. Plaintiffs Cannot Raise for the First Time on Appeal the Issues of 
Defendant's Purported Failure to Respond to Discovery Requests. 
The fact that the Defendant did not respond to the Plaintiffs5 discovery requests is 
before this court. The certificate of mailing of Plaintiff s First Set of Discovery was filed 
December 16, 2008. There is no certificate of mailing of any answers from the Defendant. 
Neither does the Defendant deny that it did not respond to the Plaintiffs' discovery 
requests. This fact is not an issue for which the Plaintiffs are $eeking a remedy. This 
fact is the basis of Plaintiff s claim that the Defendant is before this court with unclean 
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hands. This claim the Defendant does not deny. 
Dismissal is an equitable remedy. It is not a remedy based on merit. In order for 
the Defendant to be entitled to such an extreme remedy as dismissal of a lawsuit with 
prejudice, the Defendant must appear before court with clean hands. He admits that he 
also failed to comply with the rules of discovery at the same time as he demands strict 
compliance by the Plaintiff. 
The clean hands, is an equitable doctrine. Johnson v. National Public Service Ins. 
Co., 536 P.2d 138, 141 (Utah 1975) "It is elemental that one who invokes considerations 
of equity and good conscience must have so conducted herself as to justifiably demand 
them." "The clean hands doctrine finds expression in the maxim that' he who seeks 
equity must do equity." Rosenthyne v. Matthews-McCulloch Co., 51 Utah 38, 168 P. 
957, 960 (1917)). The Defendant is not entitled to relief until he has shown that he 
complies with the same rules of procedure that he demands of the Plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant did not respond to the issues raised by the Plaintiff, including 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the trial court 
case by failing to consider the factors required to justify dismissal.. 
2. Whether the discovery responses provided by the Plaintiff in substance 
complied with the requirement of initial disclosures or was harmless error. 
3. Whether equity demands a remand to the trial court. 
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4. Whether the Defendants were acting in bad faith. 
Having not responded, any defense is waived, and the Plaintiff is deemed to have 
prevailed. 
The Defendant raised three new issues. In Defendant's first issue the Plaintiff 
showed that the lower court failed to utilize the two part test required for dismissal. The 
first part is abuse of discretion and the second is an absent of injustice. Even if there 
were facial justification, the Defendant cannot not deny that there is actual injustice in the 
dismissal. 
The second issue is whether the Plaintiffs complied with Rule 26. Under Utah's 
substantial compliance test, the Plaintiffs succeed and the court should have found 
substantial compliance. 
Defendant's last issue is whether the Plaintiff can rais$ for the first time on appeal 
the issues of Defendant's purported failure to respond to discovery requests. The 
Plaintiffs do not seek sanctions for the Defendant's failure to cooperate, only that the 
Defendant appeared with unclean hands. "One who seeks equity, must do equity." 
This case should be remanded to the district court so th^t the case may proceed to 
trial. r ^ r - \ CX 
August 18,2010 \ 3 N ^ \ ^ 
Alvin RTtt indgr^r^—^ 
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